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Due in part to both the erWarren Court" and the public's conception of "law and order," a heightened interest in the field of criminal
justice has recently emerged. One of the chief concerns arising from
this increased interest is the propriety of plea bargaining- a practice
that is probably the dominant form of non-trial adjudication in our
system of criminal justice today. Professors Newman and NeMoyer
discuss this practice of negotiated justice from many different perspectives. The authors accurately pinpoint the many present and potential
abuses of the practice which have been justly condemned by critical
observers of the criminal justice system. The authors do, however, feel
that a compromise can be reached that not only will retain this admittedly efficient practice but also will solve the serious propriety
concerns that now cloud the practice of negotiated justice. If the state
removes the practice from the shadows within which it now operates
and bases its charge and sentence concessions on the propermotivations,
the authors feel that the practice of plea bargainingcan continue and
st rvive.
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INTRODUCTION

N

EGOTIATED criminal convictions and the processes by which
they are accomplished have recently received increased attention
by courts, researchers, bar associations, and other observers of and
commentators on the criminal justice system.' What has emerged from
the research and from the kinds of cases which have reached appellate
1Newman v.

United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Pleas of Guilty (approved
draft, 1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA PROJECT]; L. HALL, Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE
& J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 924-1000 (3d ed. 1969); D. NEWMAN,
CONVICTION-THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966)
[hereinafter cited as D. NEWMAN]; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS, Disposition
Without Trial (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT].
PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS
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court levels is a picture of American courtroom justice which is substantially different from that of the adversary process epitomized by
the jury trial. Although the guilty plea process in general, and the
negotiated plea in particular, are highly adversary processes in many
cases, they operate in a manner that is sub rosa, largely invisible, and
without the ground rules that place constraints on the formal battle of
contested cases in the courtroom. The great issues and conflicts in
modern American criminal law, ranging from the Miranda warnings
to disputes over different tests of insanity, are rendered largely irrelevant by guilty pleas. Ironically, the significance of the leading criminal
decisions of the Warren court may be primarily the extent to which
their possible application can be threatened by a defendant attempting
to reach a compromise with the State.
Plea negotiation has long been familiar to initiates of the criminal
court: an elite, if you will, made up of offenders (particularly recidivists who have gone the route before), prosecuting attorneys, experienced defense counsel, and trial court judges. And the army of court
attendants -clerks,
bailiffs, jailers, police, and probation staffalso have been cognizant of plea negotiation in practice if not in theory.
Recently, however, the world of the negotiated plea has come to the
awareness of outsiders, including legal scholars, appellate court judges,
sociologists, and various bar commissions and committees. This is not
to say that such practices were unknown to these persons, but rather
that these practices were not attended to directly and frankly or considered to be of any particular major consequence.
Yet the guilty plea, particularly where it is overtly negotiated,
describes a form of criminal justice that may well be the dominant
form of adjudication in virtually all jurisdictions. 2 Negotiated justice suspects and defendants "dealing" with the state - has wide perimeters; including such practices as police exercising leniency with
informants, parole board "negotiating" releases with prisoners, and
probation and parole officers bargaining with their charges where
revocation is possible.8 Yet, the focus of negotiated justice and its
major impact on our ideological foundations occurs at stages where
ABA PROJECT, supra note 1, at 1, states that -in some localities as many as 95 percent
of the criminal cases are disposed of in this way (pleas of guilty]"; TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 1, at 9, indicates a guilty plea percentage of 87 percent in trial courts of
general jurisdiction in states in which such information was available.
3 For a general treatment of negotiation at points other than the plea of guilty see Cressey,
Negotiated Justice, 5 CRIMINOLOGICA 5 (1968), and Scheff, Negotiated Realit0 : Notes
on Power in the Assessment of Responsibility, 16 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 3 (1968). For a
descriptive analysis of factors relevant to the granting or denial of parole see Dawson,
The Decision to Grant or Deny Parole: A Study of Parole Criteria in Law and Practice,
1966 U. WASH. L.Q. 243-85; and for an analysis of revocation discretion, see Hunt,
The Revocation Decision: A Study of Probation and Parole Agents Discretion, 1964
(unpublished MSW thesis, University of Wisconsin), partly reproduced in REMINGTON,
2

NEWMAN,

(1969).

KIMBALL, MELLI & GOLDSTEIN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION 912-19
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the prosecutor and the court are involved and where the citizen becomes
the convicted offender. The protections of the criminal trial are, after
all, one of our cultural hallmarks, and the propriety of bargaining for
pleas of guilty where the right to trial is given up raises important
questions, questions which go to the very underpinnings of criminal
justice in our society.
I.

THE PURPOSES OF NEGOTIATED PLEAS

Since there has been much recently written about this topic, it is
perhaps unnecessary to go into great detail about the relative merits
of guilty plea contracts for both the state and the accused. It is sufficient
to emphasize that from the point of view of the state, the guilty plea
system is by far the most efficient way of achieving and maintaining
a high conviction rate. It is quick, cheap, and relatively effortless.
Furthermore, it is effective in the sense that it assures conviction, a
result that is always uncertain at trial no matter how carefully the
state's case is prepared. Whether it is effective in larger perspective, i.e.,
the successful rehabilitation of offenders who are so convicted, is
another matter, the answer to which is not quite so clear.
For example, it has been claimed that a long range effect of
bargain justice is cynicism, not reform, and that it leads to sentence
disparity, not uniform treatment. 4 But from the point of view of the
state, the guilty plea, whether it is negotiated or not, avoids all the
sticky questions of law that have so recently confronted the Supreme
Court. In most jurisdictions the plea is a waiver of all prior defects:
There is no test of whether a search was legal or illegal; there is no test
of whether the Miranda warning was properly given; and there is no
test of whether the evidence gathered by the state even proves a prima
facie case of guilt against the defendant, unless there is a pre-trial
(pre-plea here) hearing. In most jurisdictions permitting the guilty
plea, the police, the prosecutor, and, at least until the present time,
the trial judge, are generally off the hook.5
It is important to note, however, that the advantages of the guilty
plea to the state are not simply matters of efficiency and avoidance
4 See Dash, Cracks in the Foundation of Criminal Justice, 46 ILL. L. REv. 385 (1951).
See also Ohlin & Remington, Sentencing Structure: Its Effect Upon Systems for the
Administration of CriminalJustice, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 495 (1958); Remington
& Newman, The Highland Park Institute on Sentence Disparity,26 FED. PoB. 3 (March
1962); Comment, The Influence of the Defendant's Plea on Judicial Determination of
Sentence, 66 YALE L.J. 204, 222 (1956). See generally Seminar and Institute on Disparity of Sentences, 30 F.R.D. 401 (1962); D. NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 42-44, 99-104,
210-16, 230.
5he chance of successfully challenging a guilty plea by appeal has traditionally been
extremely remote, but today the number of potential successes of such appeals may be on
the increase. See generally Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969); Case v.
Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336 (1965); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain,
372 U.S. 293 (1963); L. HALL, supra note 1, at 12; C. WIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE (CIMINAL) §§ 589-91 (1969).
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of any challenge to enforcement methods and the quantum of evidence.
There is potentially in every plea an element of equity that full prosecution, maximum charging, and maximum sentencing after a trial may
preclude. By downgrading charges and/or by granting probation, the
conscientious prosecutor and judge may act to individualize justice by
making sensible distinctions between defendants who, although technically guilty of the same criminal conduct, do not deserve either the
same record or the same mandatory sentence. Furthermore, plea negotiation and sentencing leniency act to support other parts of the criminal
justice system. Leniency in charging or sentencing may be an effective
reward for police informers or for cooperative state's witnesses without
whom more serious cases could not be developed. Charge reduction
and plea negotiation may select for the probation staff those offenders
most likely to respond to treatment in the community, whereas full
enforcement and maximum conviction might put inappropriate offenders in correctional institutions to their long-range detriment and at
great loss to their families and the community at large. In short, the
avoidance of rigidity and slot-machine justice- in addition to matters
of efficiency and the avoidance of challenge to enforcement methods
and quantum of evidence - constitute at least one side of the state's
case in plea negotiation.
The advantages of plea negotiation from the point of view of the
defendant are, of course, reasonably obvious. He receives a sentence
less severe than that allocated by the legislature for his actual criminal
conduct. Or, and this is a factor of independent importance, he may
receive a label that is neither as harsh nor as damaging as that which
would normally attach to his conduct. Having a record of conviction
for a misdemeanor is almost always better than having a felony record;
likewise, conviction for assault has a somewhat less negative connotation
that conviction for forcible rape. Furthermore, the defendant and his
family sometimes benefit or at least suffer minimum reputational harm
from the relative anonymity of the guilty plea process. A defendant
who goes through a trial, even if he is eventually acquitted, often finds
details of his private life and allegations of his criminal proclivities
spread daily throughout his community. The guilty plea, however, is
quick and generally not as newsworthy as the full-scale trial where all
the evidence is laid out, the case of Senator Edward Kennedy notwithstanding.
Certain defendants, particularly those who have long prior records
or who otherwise are not able or eligible to be placed on bail, have
still another advantage in "copping-out." The long but customary delay
in scheduling trial in most jurisdictions means that these persons will
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spend a relatively long period of time in detention pending trial,6 and
most offenders with any prior experience prefer to do time in a prison
(a facility for convicted persons) rather than in a lock-up or jail (a
facility for persons awaiting trial). Hence, where the possibility of an
eventual prison sentence is fairly likely anyway, a quick arraignment
and a guilty plea will move the defendant rather rapidly from the jail
into the prison environment which, on the average, is more comfortable,
cleaner, safer, and less given to the long weeks of idleness, characteristic of pre-trial lock-ups.
A point often overlooked is the possible benefit of wide-spread
plea bargaining to those defendants who now elect to stand trial.
Should plea negotiation be somehow curtailed, with a corresponding
increase in the number of trials, it could well have the effect of judges
and juries taking a more cavalier attitude towards the rights of defendants. A flood of trials, particularly with a greater likelihood of guilty
persons demanding them since they gain nothing by a guilty plea, could
well erode the presumption of innocence which is stronger if the event,
namely a demand for trial, is comparatively rare.
II.

TYPES OF PLEA NEGOTIATION

There are at least two major forms of plea negotiations whose
propriety is of current concern. One type, the "implicit bargain," is
present in practically all guilty pleas and has to do with differential
sentencing leniency shown to the pleader over the defendant (perhaps
with the same prior record and accused of the same crime) who has
demanded trial. The pervasiveness of this practice is clear' and amounts
to encouraging a steady flow of guilty pleas, reducing the congestion
of trial calendars in metropolitan areas, and in each case, rural or urban,
avoiding the effort and uncertainty of trial.
Trial judges are the chief proponents and often the sole initiates
of such practices.' In the ordinary case the defendant has not overtly
made any bargain with the prosecutor or the court but has entered his
plea in hope of a sentencing break. In effect, he throws himself on the
6 For the

impact on defendants and the subsequent outcome of their cases, see Ares & Sturz,
Bail and the Indigent Accused, 8 CRIM. & DEL. 12 (1962); LaFave, Alternatives to the
Present Bail System, 1965 U. ILL. L. FORUM 8; Paulsen, Pre-Trial Release in the United
States, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 109 (1966); Rankin, The Effect of Pre-trial Detention, 39

N.Y.U.L. REV. 641 (1964); Note, A Study of the Administration of Bail in New York
Cit), 106 U. PA. L. REV. 693 (1958).
7 CROSS, PARADOXES IN PRISON SENTENCES, 22-24 (1965); LUMMUS, THE TRIAL JUDGE

(1937); D. NEWMAN, supra note 1, ch.4; Ohlin & Remington, supra note 4, at 500-07;
Pilot Institute on Sentencing, 26 F.R.D. 231, 285-89 (1959); see Comment, supra note 4.
8 While trial judges in the past have often been the sole initiates of "implicit" plea nego-

tiation, recent legislative developments have added a new and not yet fully understood
dimension to this process. Laws have been passed which provide for differing sentence
alternatives, depending on whether the conviction was obtained by a full scale trial or
a plea of guilty. This "implicit" plea negotiation on the part of the legislature raises
not only propriety questions but also constitutional issues of the highest order. See
§ III (B) infra.
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mercy of the court; and the court, fully attuned to its own workload
and faced with the inevitable uncertainty of any trial, responds by
showing mercy of a greater measurable extent to those who plead than
to those who are convicted following a full-scale trial.
The other major type of bargaining and the one most commonly
alluded to when the negotiated plea is discussed involves the overt
trading of the guilty plea for prior concessions of charge reduction,
dismissals of other charges, or sentence recommendations for leniency
from the state.
Both types of negotiation, implicit and overt, have significant implications for the daily administration of criminal justice. Moreover, each
raises important questions of propriety.
III.

CONCERN FOR THE PROPRIETY OF PLEA NEGOTIATION

The guilty plea process, including both the implicit bargain and
the practice of negotiated convictions, can be evaluated from a number
of different perspectives. Few deny the efficiency of guilty pleas; some
are bothered about their possible inaccuracy. That is, there is some
concern that the administrative merits of pleading guilty are so attractive to some defendants, particularly to those who have been convicted
previously, that innocent people will admit to crimes they did not in
fact commit. This is one level of concern, and various states (as well as
the U.S. Supreme Court) have revised rules in regard to pleading
procedure.' Some have attempted to build certain safeguards into the
arraignment proceeding, such as requiring the judge, prior to his acceptance of the plea, to investigate to the point where he becomes satisfied
in his own mind that the defendant is in fact guilty of the crime charged
or, assuming charge reduction, guilty of no crime less serious than the
one to which he is pleading.1"
Another basic concern with pleas and plea negotiation, however,
does not relate specifically to whether they accurately separate the guilty
from the innocent but to whether attendant practices of differential
sentencing and overt bargaining for charge reduction are proper forms
of justice per se. Even if it were demonstrated that all defendants who
pleaded guilty were in fact guilty of criminal conduct, an independent
question of the propriety of bargaining to elicit pleas remains. The
issue becomes sharply drawn between those who see no distinction
between inducement and coercion in negating the voluntary consent
of the defendant to plead guilty and those who do see a difference.
9

For example, FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, as amended in 1966 requires the judge to address the
defendant personally to determine if the plea is being made voluntarily and the defendant
understands the consequences of his plea. It also requires the judge to satisfy himself
that there is a factual basis for the plea of guilty. See 15 ALA. CODE TIT. § 264 (1958);
VA. CODE ANNOT. §§ 19.1-192, 19.1-193 (1960).
10 See also ABA PROJECT, supra note 1, § 1.6.
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A. The Conflict and Its Advocates
The basis of the conflict extends throughout the entire system of
criminal justice. There are many devices and techniques for obtaining
confessions which are considered improper per se, even if independent
evidence proves the person guilty of the criminal conduct. For example,
coercion or threat of coercion - the third degree - is repugnant in our
ideology not only because it may lead to untrustworthy confessions, but
because such brutality is intrinsically improper in a democratic society.
There are, in short, enforcement procedures and techniques which, as
Justice Frankfurter put it, "shock the conscience;"'" and some, at least,
are excluded on due process as well as other constitutional grounds
from our law enforcement techniques. There is, however, no specific
list of totally improper, as distinguished from wholly proper, enforcement methods or devices. There is a good deal of controversy and
conflict about many techniques. For example, in the encouragement
of crime by police (the behavior precursive to the inducement of entrapment), the majority position of most appellate courts permits such
encouragement unless the police act to induce crime in an otherwise
"innocent" defendant.12 The minority position' s is that police encouragement of crime, even in those who are not "innocent," is in itself
repugnant. Questions of propriety extend to post conviction and post
sentencing treatment of offenders as well and are not limited solely
to eighth amendment matters of cruel or unusual punishment. There
appears to be increasing awareness of prisoners' rights, including requirements for at least some degree of procedural regularity and due process
in those decisions made about prisoners while under sentence. 4
The same propriety issue is now clearly drawn in respect to inducement of pleas of guilty, either by means of traditional leniency given
for the plea itself or as a result of a deal after overt bargaining. The
propriety question about plea negotiation, as at many other points in
the process, is whether an inducement-based system is any more proper
than one which rests on coercion, which is clearly contrary to our system
of government. Is a promise by a prosecutor to "recommend" probation
really any different from a threat to "throw the book" at a defendant
11
Rochin v. California,

342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
12The majority position is stated in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932) and
also incorporated in the ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (proposed official draft.
1962).
13 The minority position was stated by Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion in
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
4
1'
Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969); United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963);
Cleggett v. Pate, 229 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Ill.
1964). See Barkin, The Emergence of
Correctional Law and the Awareness of the Rights of the Convicted, 45 NEB. L. REv.
669 (1966); Kimball & Newman, judicial Intervention in CorrectionalDecisions:Threat
and Response, 14 CIuM. & DEL. 1 (1968); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCE-

MENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONS, The Legal Status ol Convicted
Persons, 82 (1967); Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law,
110 U. PA.L. Rv.985 (1962).
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if he pleads not guilty? Is the dropping of a charge in an indictment
to a lesser count, particularly to an "illogical" lesser offense,1 5 in
exchange for a guilty plea a proper practice when the prosecutor, court,
and defendant know that the defendant committed a more serious
crime and that the evidence in fact supports conviction on the higher
offense?
While as yet there are only a few identifiable members and spokesmen among those who propose and those who oppose plea bargaining,
perhaps this is because it is a new conflict, relatively speaking, litigated
only rarely on the appellate court level, not yet spoken to directly by
the United States Supreme Court, and only recently the focus of scholarly attention. The array of opponents versus proponents, the extensiveness of case law on both sides of the issue, and well articulated
arguments for or against such practices are by no means as common
nor easily available as similar debates about more familiar criminal
justice concerns, such as wiretapping, the consequences of the exclusionary rule, or the effects of the Mirandawarnings. Nevertheless, battle
lines about the propriety of plea negotiation are being drawn, and it
might reasonably be expected to become a more common basis of
dispute as more cases reach higher courts and more data is accumulated.
With the vast majority of criminal cases being terminated today by
guilty pleas, 6 it is an issue, the importance of which, cannot be denied.
Debate over the propriety of plea negotiation rests upon multiple
considerations, but the major conflict is between those who advocate
recognition (and possible control) of plea negotiation on the grounds
of expediency and those who see it as a distortion of our criminal
justice ideology. In the latter viewpoint, plea negotiation is intrinsically
improper and, furthermore, is dangerous and corrupting in its eventual
consequences. The argument that plea bargaining is efficient, even
"necessary," carries no weight against the fundamental impropriety of
the state "dealing" with criminals by inducing pleas.
Those who take the opposite tack, namely that such dealing is not
necessarily improper, rest their case in good part on the administrative
realities of current adjudication practices. In fact, they argue that the
"sociology" of our criminal justice world makes negotiation - expressed
or implicit - normative. There is good evidence that negotiation is
widespread and there are many who claim that without it the criminal
justice system would simply bog down (the assumption being that many
researchable assumption in itself) Y1
more trials would result -a
Assuming this bog down and accepting negotiated justice as not simply
16For

a discussion of "illogical" charges, see D. NEWMAN, supra note I at 99-104.
'6See note 2 supra.
17 LUMMUS, THE TRIAL JUDGE 46-47 (1937); Steinberg & Paulsen, A Conversation with
Defense Counsel on Problems of a Criminal Defense, 7 PRAC. LAW. 25, 31 (May 1961).
See also United States v. Wiley, 184 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. II. 1960).
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a minor variation of American justice but a major characteristic of it,
the argument goes that independent considerations of propriety are not
only irrelevant but are really ridiculous. The thing to do is get with it,
to recognize plea bargaining, to legitimatize the norm, to make visible
what is now an invisible process, and, in short, to bring into the open,
with appropriate sanctions and controls, what are presently common
and indeed inevitable practices no matter how much they deviate from
the hypothetical postures of our criminal justice ideals.
From this pragmatic perspective, it can be argued that the only
thing bad about plea bargaining is that it is sub rose and uncontrolled.
It is not really corruptive like bribery, nor should it act to convict the
innocent or even to harm the guilty. In fact, the leniency of plea
bargaining benefits both the state and the accused, and no one is
threatened or hurt. Therefore, as with many conflicts between ideal
and real, one can resolve the dilemma by simply recognizing the way
things are and attempting to exert proper control over it.
Further, it can be argued that there is really nothing wrong in such
an approach. Who is to say that full enforcement, maximum charging,
and the full dress trial system are any better, fairer, more just, or more
accurate than the system of plea negotiation as it operates in most
district attorneys' offices and courtroom hallways? Indeed, perhaps it
can be demonstrated that the negotiation system is in many ways more
equitable and more just than its maximum implementation counterpart.
Legislatures which define crimes and affix penalties to them are
necessarily distant from individual defendants; and, by the nature of
their tasks, they find it necessary to generalize, so that underlying the
sentences in written law is the implicit assumption that all burglars are
pretty much alike. Any distinctions between cases can be accommodated
by whatever sentencing discretion is given the trial judge. Legislatures
deal with offense and offender categories and not individual violators.
They forbid forcible rape and assign a penalty to an anonymous collection of persons who may in fact be convictable of that crime. Prosecuting attorneys and judges, however, deal not in abstractions but with
individual people and with single cases, all with a myriad of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances. The flexibility created by charge reduction
and sentencing leniency allows, or can allow, the system to operate more
equitably.
The supporters of plea agreement practices generally argue control
as strongly as recognition. Negotiation must be made visible, be circumscribed, and be made to follow certain practices and procedures as well
as to serve the efficiency needs of the court system. There are, of course,
inherent dangers in the exercise of negotiation discretion just as there
are inherent dangers in any type of administrative decisionmaking.
The line between the use of charge reduction to individualize justice
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and the use of charge reduction to perpetuate racial or economic bias
is a fine one, and one that is not tested or testable as long as the practice
remains relatively invisible to the general public, higher courts, and
the legislature itself. Formal recognition of the propriety of plea negotiation and close adherence to guidelines for its practice will, it is assumed,
provide necessary checks on unbridled, and possibly bad, adjudicatory
discretion. Supporters of recognizing and tolerating (indeed encouraging) plea agreements inevitably see distinctions between proper and
improper plea negotiation practices.
It might be worth noting at this point that the dichotomous categories for opposition or support of plea negotiation are not as readily
amenable to the standard labels which commonly become attached to
certain other criminal justice issues. In short, it is not necessarily a battle
between "liberals" and "conservatives", nor is it necessarily a dispute
between pragmatists and purists. There are strange bedfellows on each
side of the debate over the propriety of negotiated justice. This is not
to say that the positions cannot be categorized: One is clearly pragmatically oriented and the other more idealistic. But even here the
distinction is not perfectly clear cut. For example, one who argues that
plea bargaining is normative, functional, efficient, and perhaps impossible to eliminate could easily be labeled pragmatic. At the same time,
he may intersperse within his position the argument that within our
system of justice this is the only way that equity and fairness can be
built into what would otherwise be a sort of strict construction, slotmachine administration of justice. To this extent, he is idealistic. He
sees plea bargaining as just, even though it deviates from some commonly expressed sentiments about conviction based on fully tested
evidence which has resulted from maximum enforcement efforts, full
charging, and strict adherence to the legislative intent that proscribes
certain conduct and affixes certain sentences.
On the other hand, the so-called purist says, in effect, that the only
proper form of justice is compliance with the legislative authority that
defines substantive criminal conduct and appropriate limits of sentence.
Such compliance involves a moral obligation placed on the court to be
simply a fact-finder on charges accurately brought by the prosecutorthat is, charges consistent with the actual criminal conduct of the
violator and supported by sufficient and appropriately obtained evidence.
Although this form of strict construction appears based on an idealized
image of the relationship of legislature and court, the proponent may
have some pragmatic motivations. He may see the ultimate consequences
of plea negotiation as developing cynicism and disrespect for law not
only among those offenders who are processed by bargain justice but
also among the general public. Furthermore, while disdaining plea
negotiation as intrinsically corruptive, he may at the same time point
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out that one of the negative consequences of differential bargaining
opportunities is sentence disparity which, in turn, has serious implications for the rehabilitative efforts of correctional facilities. 8 Starting
from a posture expressed in idealistic terms, i.e., plea negotiation is
intrinsically bad, such arguments may rapidly incorporate the negative
pragmatic effects of bargaining on the long-range consequences of our
system of criminal justice, both in terms of those processed through it
and the image it presents to the general public.
The issue of propriety of negotiation practices cannot be resolved
simply by claiming a basis of kindness and the individualization of
justice any more than it can be resolved on the basis of efficiency. In
and of itself, the issue remains tenacious, plaguing and somewhat
unsettling in a broad view of our system of criminal justice. No matter
how efficient and no matter how benevolently intended, there seems
somehow to be something wrong with labeling (and sentencing) a
person as a burglar or petty thief when that person is, in fact, guilty of
armed robbery. Inaccurate labeling and lenient sentencing are the issues,
and the hangups, that are currently confronting courts, scholars, and
other observers of our system of justice.
The American Bar Association, through its Committee on Minimum
Standards for Criminal Justice, has attempted to resolve the dilemma
of plea bargaining. In its model draft of standards relating to Pleas of
Guilty the committee recognized the propriety of the plea agreements:
In cases in which it appears that the interest of the public in the
effective administration of criminal justice (as stated in Section 1.8)
would thereby be served, the prosecuting attorney may engage in plea
discussions for the purpose of reaching a plea agreement. He should

engage in plea discussions or reach a plea agreement with the defendant
only through defense counsel, except when the defendant is not eligible

for or does not desire appointment of counsel and has not retained
counsel. 19

And the committee attempted to control such bargaining by: (1) providing that "similarly situated defendants" be given equal plea bargaining opportunities;2" (2) forbidding the trial judge from participating
in initial plea discussions; 2' (3) providing bargaining only with and
through defense counsel;" and (4) requiring the trial judge to make
an explanation in the formal record of the arraignment if he departs
Is It is one thing for correction administrators to cope with individuals sentenced by different judges to different lengths of time for committing the same crimes; but it becomes
an even more complicated and difficult thing to deal with persons under sentence when
some, actually guilty of armed robbery, are serving a term for burglary whereas others,
guilty of armed robbery, are serving longer terms for convictions as charged. See generally
D. NEWMAN, supra note 1 at 43, 215, 230.
Is ABA PROJECT, supra note 1, § 3.1(a).

20 Id. § 3.1 (c).
2
1Id. § 3.3(a).
2id. § 3.1(a).
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from previously agreed upon concessions between prosecution and
28
defense.
While the ABA Committee goes a long way toward solving the
propriety issue by at least recognizing and attempting to control the
practice, the issue is by no means completely settled. Because of the
complexity of the process and the concerns that surround it, an examination of the specific types of plea bargaining and how they relate to
the propriety issue is in order.
B. The Propriety of feImplicit" Plea Negotiation
An issue which has come to the forefront of judicial debate is
whether or not it is proper for a trial court judge to impose a more
lenient sentence on a defendant who pleads guilty than on a counterpart
who is convicted after a full trial. The argument for this practice (and
there is ample evidence to show that it is common 24) is usually stated
in the negative - that is, the confessing and pleading defendant is
given leniency - rather than the reverse - that the defendant who
demanded trial was treated more harshly. There is a sound basis for
stating the issue in this manner. Judges who have threatened defendants
with long prison sentences unless they pleaded guilty have had the
convictions reversed and, in the process, have been chastized by appellate
25
courts for having "coerced" the guilty plea by threats of severity.
The more subtle framing of the commonly stated position today is not
that a defendant who demands his full constitutional rights to a trial
is treated severely simply because of the effort and cost of the trial, but
rather that the defendant who has "cooperated" and by his plea of
guilty has shown "repentence" is a more deserving candidate for
leniency.2 6 Since, in any event, the maximum term imposed on the
defendant convicted after trial is within statutory authorization, the
practice of differential leniency falls, with some exceptions, clearly
within established judicial sentencing discretion to distinguish between
defendants in dispersing sentences. There is then supposedly no threat
to or added punishment for the defendant who demands trial; there
is merely a break for the person who has "thrown himself on the mercy
of the court."
However, there seem to be clear exceptions to this rationale when
dealing with "legislative plea bargaining," i.e., when the legislature
2

31d.

§ 3.3(b).

2 See note 7 supra.

23Euziere v. United States, 249 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1957); United States v. Tateo, 214
F. Supp. 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), remanded for retrial, 377 U.S. 463 (1964). But see
Kent v. United States, 272 F.2d 795 (1st Cir. 1959), where threats of a prosecutor were
considered insufficient to void conviction by plea. See also Comment, The Coerced Confession Cases in Search of a Rationale, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 313 (1964).
2See, e.g., People v. Darrah, 33 Ill.
App. 2d 175, 210 N.E. 2d 478 (1965); Pilot Institute
on Sentencing, supra note 7; King, Criminal Procedure from the Viewpoint of the Trial
Judge, 25 CONN. B. J. 202, 205 (1951); Comment, supra note 4, at 209-10 (1956).
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provides for the possibility of a higher penalty upon conviction after
a full trial than upon conviction by a plea of guilty. This becomes a
very serious and complex matter in cases where conviction after trial
could result in a death sentence but where such penalty is not statutorily permitted if the defendant is convicted by a plea of guilty. The
United States Supreme Court in U.S. v. Jackson,2 7 held invalid the
death penalty provision of such a statutory arrangement. In striking
down the provision, Justice Stewart noted that "t]he inevitable effect
of any such provision is, of course, to discourage assertion of the
Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty and to deter exercise of the
Sixth Amendment right to demand a jury trial .... Whatever might be
said of Congress' objectives, they cannot be pursued by means that
needlessly chill the exercise of basic constitutional rights.' '28 Stewart
went on to say:
It is no answer to urge, as does the Government, that federal trial
judges may be relied upon to reject coerced pleas of guilty and invol-

untary waivers of jury trial. For the evil in the federal statute is not
that it necessarily coerces guilty pleas and jury waivers but simply that
it needlessly encourages them. A procedure need not be inherently
coercive in order that it be held to impose
an impermissible burden
29

upon the assertion of a constitutional right.
Subsequently, two cases (each involving defendants who were
convicted before the Jackson decision) reached the Court in which the
appellants claimed that their respective guilty pleas were invalid because
they were coerced by fear of the death penalty which could be imposed
if they chose to plead not guilty and were convicted. However, in both
0 and Brady v. United
cases, Parkerv. North Carolina"
States,3 the Court
held the pleas to be valid. In an opinion that discussed at length the
Jackson decision, the Court distinguished these pleas on the basis of
other evidence that, in the Court's opinion, rendered these pleas voluntary despite the legislative punishment scheme. It seems the "impermissible burden" referred to in Jackson was not enough to invalidate the
otherwise voluntary pleas of Parker and Brady. The Court in Brady
commented:
A contrary holding would require the States and Federal Government to forbid guilty pleas altogether, to provide a single invariable
penalty for each crime defined by the statutes, or to place the sentencing
function in a separate authority having no knowledge of the manner
in which the conviction in each case was obtained. In any event, it
would be necessary to forbid prosecutors and judges to accept guilty
pleas to selected counts, to lesser included offenses,
or to reduced
32
charges. The Fifth Amendment does not reach so far.
7 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
25Id.

at 581, 582.

2Id.

at 583.

- 397 U.S. 790, (1970).
31397 U.S. 742, (1970).

1Id. at 753.
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In combined dissenting (to Parker) and concurring (with Brady)
opinions, however, Mr. Justice Brennen, commenting on plea bargaining as it applies to the situation in Jackson, Parker and Brady, wrote:
The Court attempts to submerge the issue of voluntariness of a
plea under an unconstitutional capital punishment scheme in a general
discussion of the pressures upon defendants to plead guilty which are
said to arise from, inter alia, the venerable institution of plea bargain-

ing. The argument appears to reduce to this: because the accused
cannot be insulated from all inducements to plead guilty, it follows that
he should be shielded from none.
The principal flaw in the Court's discourse on plea bargaining,

however, is that it is, at best, only marginally relevant to the precise

issues before us. There are critical distinctions between plea bargaining
as commonly practiced and the situation presently under consideration
- distinctions which, in constitutional terms, make a difference. Thus,
whatever the merit, if any, of the constitutional objections of plea

bargaining generally, those issues are not presently before us.
We are dealing here with the legislative imposition of a markedly
more severe penalty if a defendant asserts his right to jury trial and
a concomitant legislative promise of leniency if he pleads guilty. This
is very different from the give-and-take negotiation common in plea
bargaining between the prosecution and defense, which arguably
possess relatively equal bargaining power. No such flexibility is built
into the capital penalty scheme where the government's harsh terms
with respect to punishment are stated in unalterable form. 83
Apart from death penalty cases, there is some evidence to show
that this practice of differential leniency is supported by many trial
judges. For example, the Yale Law journal sent a questionnaire inquiring about the plea-leniency relationship to all 240 federal judges and
received responses from 140 of them. Sixty-six percent of the respondents considered the defendant's plea "a relevant factor in local
sentencing procedure," and the majority of them rewarded the defendant
pleading guilty with a less severe sentence than his counterpart who
had trial. 4 At a number of judicial sentencing institutes, particularly
among federal judges, the issue of whether the guilty plea, in and of
itself, should have independent significance in sentence determinations
was considered. The majority viewpoint at one such conference was
that the guilty plea should be considered a factor in showing leniency
for a number of different reasons: 3 5 (1) state costs are saved by the
guilty plea; (2) the chance of jury acquittal is waived by the pleading
defendant, thus assuring conviction of the guilty; (3) it is necessary
to encourage the practice of pleading guilty in order to efficiently
process ever-increasing numbers of criminal cases; (4) "the realization
of wrong-doing," evidenced by the pleading defendant, was seen as a
"step toward rehabilitation" and not as a position exhibited by one
33 397

U.S. 790, 808-09 (1970) (emphasis by the Court).

34Comment, supra note 4, at 222.
35

Pilot Institute on Sentencing, supra note 7, at 287-89.
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who stood trial and who, in fact, may have perjured himself if he took
the stand in his own defense and was convicted anyway.
This was not the only position taken by sentencing judges. Some
said that it was simply wrong to penalize the defendant who exercised
his constitutional rights to a trial as against one who waived that right.
Their argument was that differential leniency, no matter how rationalized, had this effect. There was also a middle of the road position
which based the propriety issue on whether or not the defendant who
demanded trial entered a reasonable or a frivolous defense. If his
defense were frivolous, then it was agreed that differential sentencing
was proper; but if his defense were reasonable, then it was thought
that he should receive a sentence no more severe than his counterpart
who pleaded guilty.86 After the conference a committee of judges
composed what it called a "Decalogue of Sentencing," and one of
the points made therein was the following:
That the court is justified in giving a lesser sentence upon a plea
of guilty than it would give on a plea of not guilty, upon conviction
for the same offense after a trial in which the testimony of the accused
is proved to be false or in which there is some other3 7circumstance
chargeable to the accused evincing a lack of good faith.
One of the difficulties of getting at the propriety issue which may
be inherent in differential sentencing leniency is that the practice is
virtually invisible. There is no overt negotiation nor claim of it. If the
person who has had trial is sentenced within proper statutory bounds,
there is no cruel or unusual punishment issue involved. Since judges
rarely explain such differences, equal protection arguments are hard to
make.
However, a rather interesting case occurred some years ago in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 8 In this case,
there were four codefendants involved in a crime, three of whom
pleaded guilty; the other, Wiley, demanded trial. The defendant, Wiley,
who was tried and convicted, had on the record at least, a less serious
criminal background than any of his codefendants. Furthermore, his
part in the crime was peripheral (he was the driver of a car) compared
with his partners. However, he not only received a more severe sentence
than any of his three codefendants, but the judge made it clear that the
sentence was longer because he had asked for a trial. Indeed, the
defendant had requested consideration of probation, but the judge stated
that it was his "standing policy" to refuse probation to defendants who
demanded trial.3 9 In fact, he went on to say that had the defendant
demanded a jury trial instead of a bench trial, his sentence probably
36 Id. at 287.
7
Id. at 379-80.
38
United States v. Wiley, 278 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1960).
3 United States v. Wiley, 267 F.2d 453, 455 (7th Cir. 1959).
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would have been even longer.4" On appeal Wiley contended that it was
error for the judge to preclude probation following trial, and the court
41
of appeals agreed, remanding the cause for consideration of probation.
Then the trial judge held a hearing and denied probation; Wiley again
appealed. 42 On this appeal the court of appeals threw out the sentence
because the trial judge had punished the defendant for exercising, in
good faith, his right to a trial. 8
In a recent case reaching the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia, the propriety of plea concessions was again
raised in a complicated case in which there was both overt plea negotiation and the separate issue of differential leniency shown to a pleading
defendant where there was no prior agreement in this regard. In this
particular case a defendant named Scott was convicted after trial for
robbery and sentenced to prison for a term of five to fifteen years.
A codefendant changed his plea to guilty at the completion of the
government's case. The appellate court found the conviction of Scott
free from error but took under consideration the events surrounding
his sentencing, eventually affirming the conviction but remanding the
case for resentencing.4" The issues which gave the court pause in
the sentencing procedure involved, among other things, the statement
of the trial judge to Scott: " 'Now the Court didn't believe your story
on the stand, the Court believes you deliberately lied in this case. If you
had pleaded guilty to this offense, I might have been more lenient with
you.' "146 At this point the case looks quite similar to the issue in the
Wiley case. However, the circuit court noted that a new tangent to
the issue was raised when, during the sentencing hearing, the trial
judge read a letter submitted by the appellant. The letter was from the
appellant's attorney to the appellant, and it referred to a discussion
the lawyer had had with the judge's law clerk. In the letter the attorney
reported that in the clerk's opinion "there was only one way to get a
light sentence from Judge
and that was to confess that
you did the robbery, to apologize four or five times and to say that you
were willing to turn over a new leaf. -' The clerk was then called to
the witness stand by the trial judge and stated: "It has always been
40ld. at 458.
41United States v. Wiley, 267 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1959).

United States v. Wiley, 278 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1960).
Id. at 504. On remand, the trial judge stated that he had information outside the record
which indicated that the criminal background of the defendant in question was actually
more known than the evidence in the official documents showed. At resentencing, he
again imposed a three-year sentence on the defendant but, bowing to the mandate of the
Court of Appeals, suspended execution of the sentence. United States v. Wiley, 184 F.
Supp. 679 (N.D. Ill.
1960).
"Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
45 Id.
4

43

46 Id. at 267.
7

4' d.
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my opinion that you view sentencing differently when someone admits
guilt than maintaining innocence. ' 48 The circuit court noted that the
judge himself then reacted to these issues by saying: "I hope sometime
I hear some defendant say, 'Judge, I am sorry, I am sorry for what I
did.' That is what I have in mind."49
In analyzing the issues involved in this particular sentencing,
Judge Bazelon of the D.C. Circuit Court, who wrote the majority
opinion, stated:
The Supreme Court has offered little guidance concerning which
constitutional rights can tolerate some chilling effects and which cannot.
Perhaps the right to a trial, like the self-incrimination privilege but
apparently unlike the right to a jury, belongs in the latter camp. But
until the Supreme Court speaks, the practice of differential sentencing
should be evaluated with some attention paid to the nature of the price
extracted from those who plead innocent and why it is exacted.
Two arguments inevitably appear whenever differential sentencing
is discussed. The first is that the defendant's choice of plea shows
whether he recognizes and repents his crime. One difficulty with this
argument is that no court or commentator has explained why a defendant's insistence upon his self-incrimination privilege is not also
evidence of a lack of repentence. Or his insistence that evidence
unconstitutionally seized should not be admitted.
Repentence has a role in penology. But the premise of our criminal
jurisprudence has always been that the time for repentence comes after

trial. The adversary process is a fact-finding engine, not a drama of
contrition in which a prejudged defendant is expected to knit up his
lacerated bonds to society.
There is a tension between the right of the accused to assert his
innocence and the interest of society in his repentence. But we could
consider resolving this conflict in favor of the latter interest only if trial
offered an unparalleled opportunity to test the repentence of the
accused. It does not. There is other, and better, evidence of such
repentence. The sort of information collected in presentence reports
provides a far more finely brushed portrait of the man than do a few
hours or days at trial. And the offender while on probation or in
prison after trial 50
can demonstrate his insight into his problems far
better than at trial.

At a later point Judge Bazelon commented:
The second argument for differential sentencing is necessity.
Most convictions, perhaps as many as 90 per cent in some jurisdictions,
are the product of guilty pleas. Unless a large proportion of defendants
plead guilty, the argument runs, the already crowded dockets in many
jurisdictions would collapse into chaos.
Thus, to the extent that the appellant here received a longer
sentence because he pleaded innocent, he was a pawn sacrificed to
induce other defendants to plead guilty. Since this is so, to consider

the price he paid for the exercise of his right without regard for the
process of which it is but one instance would be to ignore reality. 51
4

8Id.
49Id.
5Id.at
51

270-71.
Id.at 271, 272.
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The cases of Wiley and Scott both point up the necessity for judges
to explain differential sentencing in the negative: reward the pleader
rather than punish the defendant who stands trial. It seems from the
comments of the various sentencing institutes that this rationale is
proper and will be accepted by the appellate courts. The Supreme Court
has also seen fit to sanction (albeit dictum) this reward theory in
52
Brady v. United States.
C. The Propriety of the Overtly Negotiated Plea
The implicit bargain, the showing of leniency to the confessing
and presumably 'repenting" defendant is one thing; overt negotiation
for charge reduction or a promise of sentence leniency in exchange for
a guilty plea is another matter. In the first place, it is open and adversary in its own right. It is not simply a form of normative practice
intrinsic to administrative efficiency. Whatever its degree of adversariness, the contest occurs out of court without whatever controls are
provided by trial. Yet overt negotiation is common practice almost
everywhere, particularly in those jurisdictions where there are mandatory sentences for certain classes of crimes.
The basic legal issue of propriety of overt plea negotiation is
superficially simple but becomes complex when set against administrative reality. The propriety question is normally phrased as follows:
whether guilty pleas which are induced by promises of state concessions
in charge or sentence are any more trustworthy or any less repugnant
than those engendered by threat or coercion. Some of the more specific
problem areas associated with overt bargaining are discussed below.
1. The Contested Bargain
Unlike the situation with regard to alleged coercion, the general
position of appellate courts reviewing cases involving induced pleas
(usually on appeal from a denial of a motion to withdraw the plea)
has been that they have viewed the situation as one of whether the promise made by the appropriate state official (commonly held to be either
the prosecutor or the judge but normally not including the police or the
defendant's own counsel 5s ) was, in fact, honored after the defendant fulfilled his part of the bargain by pleading guilty. If the bargain was not
kept - that is, if the state reneged on its promise - appellate courts
have commonly allowed plea withdrawals, presumably on the grounds
that the state used fraud and trickery in obtaining the guilty plea and
52 397 U.S. 742, 751 (1970).
53

People v. Smith, 120 Cal. App. 2d 531, 261 P.2d 306 (1953); cf. Swanson v. United
States, 304 F.2d 865 (8th Cir. 1962); Bryarly v. Howard, 165 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1948).
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that these practices are not really significantly different from threat and
54
coercion.
The issue becomes sharper, though no more simple to answer, in
instances of induced pleas where in fact the state honors its bargains;
yet defendants challenge the "voluntariness" of their own guilty pleas
on grounds of inducement. Since such defendants have presumably
benefited by the contractual relationship - that is, they have received
reduced charges, dismissed counts, or sentences less than the criminal
court would warrant - it seems improbable that many such cases would
reach the appellate level since, in effect, there is no injured party.
However, one such case did reach the United States Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit," and the conflicts, confusions and
uncertainties presented by it are still bothering American criminal
justice. The petitioner, Shelton, moved to have his one-year sentence
vacated on the ground that his guilty plea was induced by the promise
of a one-year sentence by the prosecutor. In the first Shelton decision
it was held that the guilty plea was involuntary because it was induced,
even though it was conceded that the grounds for the inducement were
fulfilled.5" In the majority opinion, Judge Rives stated: "Justice and
liberty are not the subjects of bargaining and barter.' '5 However, in
a dissent, Judge Tuttle distinguished between "proper" and "improper"
bargaining, basing his major argument for upholding Shelton's conviction on the administrative necessity of plea negotiation. Judge Tuttle
said in part:
[Ajlthough no man should be allowed to bargain away his life or
liberty, it is not apparent why any innocent person would plead guilty

if not subjected to or threatened with illegal pressures (including
exhaustive inquisitions or threats to "frame" evidence of a more serious
charge), mislead by promises not to be fulfilled, or induced by promises inherently improper, merely because he receives assurances that
such a plea may lead to punishment less severe than that which he
would receive if unjustly (but fairly) convicted....

... It is generally known that the great bulk of criminal cases are
disposed of by pleas of guilty made after some discussion between the
defendant and/or his counsel and the prosecuting attorney in which

the latter frequently makes some commitment as to the sentence he will
recommend or as to other charges or prosecutions he will drop; if this

were not so, or if this court held that it may not be so, there would be

few inducements for any person to plead guilty....
In the present case it appears from the record and from his own
appearance before us that the petitioner was an intelligent man, fully
able to comprehend the alternatives open to him and the value of the
54See Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas,
112 U. PA. L. REV. 865, 876-78 (1964). See also Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S.
487 (1962); Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1962); In re Valles, 364
Mich. 471, 110 N.W.2d 673 (1961); FRANK, CORAM NOBIS § 3.01(d) (1953).
5 Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1957), rev'd on rehearing,246 F.2d 571
(5th Cir. 1957), rev'd on confession of error of Solicitor General, 356 U.S. 26 (1958).
56
Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1957).
5

7Id. at 113.
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prosecutor's promises. It also appears that the prosecutor in good faith
tried to live up to his commitments and to a very large extent was
successful in his efforts .... Nor can it be said that any of the promises were inherently improper for the offer to help obtain the dismissal
of federal prosecutions in other districts does not differ fundamentally
from the usual practice whereby a prosecutor agrees to
nolle prosequi
all except the charges in which the plea is to be entered. 5 8

In an en banc rehearing of the Shelton case, the minority position
(of Judge Tuttle) in the first decision became the majority opinion."
Judge Tuttle wrote:
In light of the full record, showing that the accused was not only
willing but anixous to have his plea accepted by the court, and the
present claim of involuntariness after he has fully enjoyed the benefit
of the dismissal of an additional count in the Atlanta indictment and
the nolle prossing of the 'more serious federal indictment' (as characterized by Shelton) in Miami - the reinstatement of which is now
barred by statutes of limitations - and the imposition of the sentence
requested by him in the principle case, cannot deprive the plea thus
given of its character of voluntariness. 0

Judge Rives joined by Judge Brown dissented, saying, in part:
The very statement of that practice [referring to Judge Tuttle's
earlier reference to the frequency and administrative importance of plea
negotiation] however, concedes that such promises or commitments
are inducements for the accused to plead guilty. Such inducements in
any particular case may be sufficient to elicit an untrue plea of guilty.
The prevalence of that practice demonstrates the importance, indeed
the imperative necessity, for the court itself to determine that the plea
is so voluntarily made as to furnish reliable and trustworthy testimony
that the accused is in fact guilty....
... We err greviously when we allow ourselves to be diverted by
other inquiries, such as whether the accused made a good bargain and
whether the bargain was kept; the sole inquiry should remain, was
the plea of guilty made under such circumstances as to constitute it
reliable and trustworthy evidence of the accused's guilt of the offense
with which he was charged. 61

The Shelton case eventually reached the Supreme Court which
issued a per curiam decision, stating only "[u]pon consideration of the
entire record and confession of error by the Solicitor General that
the plea of guilty may have been improperly obtained, the judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is reversed
and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings. ' 62 In a subsequent case, Brown v. Beto, 8 the Fifth Circuit considered the Supreme Court's per curiam action as neither an approval
RId. at 115, 116.
5 Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1957).
60Id. at 573 (emphasis by the court).
61 1d. at 579, 580 (emphasis by the court).
62
63

Shelton v. United States, 356 U.S. 26 (1958).
377 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1967).
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nor a disapproval of either Judge Tuttle's or Judge Rives' view on plea
bargaining.1

4

2. Judicial Involvement in Plea Negotiation
A question has arisen in a number of cases as to whether plea
bargaining in which the sentencing judge is directly involved may be
improper, even if it is conceded that bargaining between prosecutor
66
and defense is proper.6 5 In United States ex rel Elksnis v. Gilligan,
District Judge Weinfeld stated in part:
[A] bargain agreement between a judge and a defendant, however
free from any calculated purpose to induce a plea, has no place in a
system of justice. It impairs the judge's objectivity in passing upon the
voluntariness of the plea when offered. As a party to the arrangement
upon which the plea is based, he is hardly in a position to discharge
his function of deciding the validity of the plea - a function not satisfied by routine inquiry, but only, as the Supreme Court has stressed
[citation omitted], by a penetrating and comprehensive examination
of
67
all the circumstances under which such a plea is tendered.

While alluded to above, an interesting caveat to the judges "hands
off" role in plea negotiation was more explicitly dealt with by Judge
Bazelon in the Scott decision:
In announcing the rule that the trial judge should neither participate directly in plea bargaining nor create incentives for guilty pleas
by a policy of differential sentences, we must at the same time point
out that the trial judge cannot ignore the plea bargaining process.
A guilty plea must be not only voluntary, but also knowing andunderstanding. If the defendant has decided to admit his guilt because of a
commitment from the prosecutor, it is essential for the validity of his
plea that he have a full and 68
intelligent understanding of the nature and
extent of that commitment.

The ABA standards relating to pleas of guilty attempt to correct
the possibility of an attack like that in Elksnis by excluding the judge
as a participant in the actual negotiation process.69 The reasons given
by the ABA Committee are as follows: (1) judicial participation in the
discussions can create the impression in the mind of the defendant that
he would not receive a fair trial were he to go to trial before this judge;
(2) judicial participation in the discussions makes it difficult for the
judge objectively to determine the voluntariness of the plea when it
is offered; (3) judicial participation to the extent of promising a
certain sentence is inconsistent with the theory behind the use of the
presentence investigation report; and, (4) the risk of not going along
with the disposition apparently desired by the judge may seem so great
6Id.
65

at 954.
d. at 956-57.

F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
at 255.
6 Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 274 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
69 ABA PROJECT, supra note 1, § 3.3 (a).
66256
6Id.
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to the defendant that he will be induced to plead guilty even if
innocent. 0
3. Equal Opportunity to Bargain
However the general issue of the propriety of plea negotiation is
viewed, and whether one limits it by restricting the appropriate participants (such as by excluding the judge) or testing it against its fulfillment in practice, there are still other dimensions of propriety which
arise and plague some appellate courts. For example, while the ABA
Minimum Standards state that similarly situated defendants should be
given an equal opportunity for plea negotiation,7 1 some cases have
recently arisen in which denial of knowledge of, or opportunity for,
bargaining and, therefore, failure to benefit from such dealings were
appealed on denial of equal protection grounds. In Dorrough v. United
States,7 2 the appellant contended that he did not fully understand the
nature of the charges against him, because the offense with which he
was charged contained a lesser included offense with a significantly
lower mandatory penalty, and he claimed that it was incumbent upon
the trial court to fully advise him of this fact. The majority opinion
rejected this argument, but Circuit Judge Goldberg in his dissent stated:
It would be uncandid also to fail to mention that upon learning
of a lesser included offense, the defendant might announce to the
prosecution that he would consent to plead guilty only to the lesser
offense, in the hope that the prosecution would allow him to plead
rather than go through the risk and bother of a trial.
Plea bargaining,
at present, must be recognized as part of our system. 73
In Newman v. United States, 74 a case arising almost simultaneously
with Dorrough but in the D.C. Circuit, the equal protection issue was
more sharply drawn. The issue presented on appeal was whether it
was a denial of appellant's constitutional rights for the U.S. Attorney
to consent to a guilty plea tendered by appellant's codefendant for a
lesser included offense under the indictment, while refusing to consent
to the same plea for the appellant. Both defendants were indicted for
house breaking and petty larceny. One of the defendants, Anderson,
negotiated through counsel with the U.S. Attorney and obtained an
agreement allowing Anderson to plead guilty to the misdemeanors of
petty larceny and attempted house breaking. The U.S. Attorney, however, declined to consent to the same plea for Newman. In denying
Newman's appeal, Circuit Judge Burger (now Chief Justice of the
United States Supreme Court) said in part:
To say that the United States Attorney must literally treat every
offense and every offender alike is to delegate him an impossible task;
70 Id. § 3.3(a) (commentary).
71Id. § 3.1(c).

72 385 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1967), aff'd on En Banc rehearing, 397 F.2d 811 (5th Cir. 1968).
7 385 F.2d 887, 898 (5th Cir. 1967).
74 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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of course, this concept would negate discretion. Myriad factors can
enter into the prosecutor's decision. Two persons may have committed
what is precisely the same legal offense but the prosecutor is not compelled by law, duty or tradition to treat them the same as to charges.
On the contrary, he is expected to exercise discretion and common sense
to the end that if, for example, one is a young first offender and the
other older, with a criminal record, or one has played a lesser and the
other a dominant role, one the instigator and the other a follower,
the prosecutor can and should take such factors into account; no court
has any jurisdiction to inquire into or review his decision.
It is assumed that the United States Attorney will perform his
duties and exercise his powers consistent with his oaths and while this
discretion is subject to abuse or misuse just as is judicial discretion,
deviations from his duty as an agent of the Executive are to be dealt
75
with by his superiors.
How this discretion is exercised - i.e., the motivation of the prosecutor in his bargaining role -is apparently an important element of
the whole process. In People v. Byrd, 76 Judge Levin, using his concurring opinion to take to task the whole process of plea negotiation, made
the following points:
Unlike the private litigant who is encouraged to negotiate amicable
adjustment of differences, the prosecutor has a duty to exercise the
discretion his office vests in him strictly on the merits. The state of his
or the court's docket has nothing to do with the propriety of a particular charge reduction for a particular offender. Justice is not "individualized" by making charge concessions available almost universally as long
as the offender pleads guilty. The only "individualization" is that those
who plead guilty do so to some other, lesser charge and those who stand
trial must answer for the greater offense. To defend this on the ground
it is "individualization of justice" is an obvious distortion of terms.
Defenders of plea bargaining cite as examples of laudable "individualization" through plea bargaining, particular cases where noxious
charges have been reduced to less stigmatic ones. However, if such
individualization is deemed desirable it could be achieved without
exacting a plea in return for the reduction in charge, indeed, without
any negotiation with the defendant. It is hard to see how such discretionary decisions are furthered by - or even how they can survive the plea bargaining system. If the reward of charge reduction is to
continue to serve as an inducement to guilty pleas, the prosecutor may
but infrequently hand out such reductions, even where his view on the
merits would warrant or demand it, unless the benefitted defendant
pleads guilty.
I do not mean to be understood as saying prosecutors do not, in
particular cases, exercise their discretion on the merits and permit
accused persons to stand trial on reduced charges. But, to the extent
prosecutors become dependent upon plea bargaining, and thus implicitly
devoted to maintaining the bargaining
system, they become less free in
77
the exercise of their discretion.
Other than questions of judicial participation and equal plea oppor75Id. at 481-82.
76 12 Mich. App. 186, 162 N.W.2d 777 (Ct. App. 1968).
77

Id. 162 N.W.2d at 784, 787 (emphasis by the court).
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tunities, there is even more basic, idealistic opposition to the negotiation
of justice.
4. Bargaining as Intrinsically Improper
Judge Rives' statement in the first Shelton case that "[fjustice and
liberty are not the subject of bargaining and barter, ' 7 8 expresses the
intrinsic impropriety issue very clearly. In a Pennsylvania case 71 the court
used even stronger language. In that case, defense counsel approached
the judge hoping to obtain a sentence promise prior to entry of a guilty
plea for his client and, having assumed he had received such a promise,
later attempted to withdraw the plea after the defendant was sentenced
to death. The lawyer claimed that a bargain was made and unfulfilled.
This elicited a statement from the sentencing court which, in commenting upon the practice of an attorney approaching a judge prior to the
plea, referred to such conduct as "not becoming a member of the bar."8 0
The appellate court agreed with the trial court's refusal to allow withdrawal of the plea, calling the defense counsel's conduct "indefensible
and outrageous. 81
There have been other sporadic expressions by appellate judges
about the impropriety of plea bargaining regardless of its advantages.
But by far the most detailed and elaborate recent analysis of the process,
with a final conclusion that plea negotiation is inherently and intrinsically improper, was written by Judge Levin concurring in the Byrd
decision. He said:
The negotiated guilty plea is, nevertheless, fundamentally unsound.
Besides the fact that it is inconsistent with established standards, those
regarding the exercise of discretion by public officers and those surrounding the administration of justice generally, it is turning what used
to be an accusatorial-adversary judicial system into an inquisitorialadministrative process. It encourages practices in which neither the
profession nor the judiciary can take pride and establishes precedents
which are bound to affect the administration of justice adversely in

other areas. It destroys the integrity of the conviction record with the
result that neither the parole board nor, upon commission of another
offense, a subsequent sentencing judge knows whether one originally
charged with X and allowed to plead guilty to X-1, X-2 or attempted X
or Y was really guilty of the more serious charge.
If the negotiated charge concession is not justified by the merits,
then the injury is to society. If a charge concession justified by the
merits can only be obtained by waiver of a jury trial, then it is the

defendant who is unjustly importuned, it is the constitutional right
which is tarnished. If the concession is illusory rather than real, e.g., a
reduction in charge but no reduction in sentence, the trial judge sentencing just as he would on the greater offense, then, frequently, the
defendant has been misled into giving up his right to a trial.
78242 F.2d 101, 113 (5th Cir. 1957).
7

9Commonwealth v. Scoleri, 415 Pa. 218, 202 A.2d 521 (1964).

80d.202 A.2d at 526.
81415 Pa. 218, 228, 202 A.2d 521, 526 (1964).
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A plea of guilty uninfluenced by official pressure (overt or covert)
or promise (explicit or implicit) is, of course, perfectly proper. But the
administration of criminal justice has become so dependent upon a large
volume of guilty pleas and the profession (prosecutorial and defense)
and some courts so widely encourage offenders to believe they have
something to gain by pleading guilty, that it is to be doubted whether
many who plead guilty do so without harboring the hope that they will
receive some leniency.
The present state of affairs was brought about by willingness to
reduce standards of justice to conform to the resources made available
for its administration. I suggest the time has come for the judiciary to
start moving in the other direction, and to insist on a return to first
principles as quickly as possible. It will, of course, take years, if not
decades, to accomplish the elimination of negotiated pleas. The necessary increase in prosecutorial staff and judicial facilities cannot be
brought about within a short period of time.
The public must be made aware that, under present budgets, most
felons are permitted to plead guilty to a charge substantially less than
the crime of which they are guilty. We are all concerned with the
significant increase in crime. Yet many who are apprehended are too
soon back on the streets because of concessions that would not be considered if facilities for prosecution and adjudication were more adequate. Police officers bring in an accused person and the prosecutor is
confronted with the choice of allowing him to plead guilty to a lesser
offense or waiting for months and sometimes years to bring him to
trial, by which time witnesses may have lost interest, memories may have
faded, and for those and other reasons prosecution is difficult, if not
impossible, all of which aids defense counsel in exacting concessions
which otherwise would not be at all appropriate and which no prosecutor would otherwise consider.
The judiciary need not accept the inadequate budgets allowed for
the administration of justice. Ours is a co-equal branch of government.
Those charged with the administration of justice may properly insist on
appropriations sufficient to enable prosecutors and courts to enforce
the laws that the legislature and local units of government enact.
I respectfully urge that we not continue to denigrate the judicial
system by attempting to organize the administration of criminal justice
around an ever declining prosecutorial and judicial budget per case.
The calendar problem is, of course, real. The administration of
criminal justice has become so dependent upon plea bargaining that
it could not be eliminated instanter by decree. To do so would be to
inundate our presently over-taxed prosecutorial and judicial facilities.
This, of course, is a matter for realistic concern - as is the fundamental
soundness of a system of justice whose very ability to function is said
to depend on the practices described.
The problem is not unlike that of segregated schools in that it is
too ingrained to be eliminated
forthwith. I suggest that we proceed
82
to its eventual elimination.
IV.

DIMENSIONS OF THE CONCERN FOR THE IMPROPRIETY
OF PLEA BARGAINING

Negotiation for pleas of guilty, particularly overt bargaining for a
plea when there is a reasonable likelihood that the person could be
82 People

court).

v. Byrd, 12 Mich. App. 186, 162 N.W.2d 777, 796-97 (1968)
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convicted of a higher crime or be given a more severe sentence, raises
propriety concerns on a number of different levels. In addition to the
concerns with respect to the overt bargain discussed above, there are
larger, more far-reaching concerns about the plea negotiation process
in general that must be resolved if the process is to continue to exist
within our criminal justice system. These broad considerations can be
classified as either concern for the proper dispensation of justice or as
concern for a positive public attitude.
A. Concern for the Proper Dispensation of Justice
These concerns generally go to specific, undesirable side effects
that may be a byproduct of plea negotiation. Included within this
category are the fears that plea negotiation might increase the possibility
of convicting the innocent, introduce inequalities into adjudication and
sentencing practices, avoid the testing of many legal issues, and promote
"quick justice."
1. Plea Negotiation Might Increase the Possibility of Convicting
the Innocent
While there have been some steps taken by the United States
Supreme Court in its decisions8 8 and in its revision of the Rules of
Federal Criminal Procedure,8 4 by various states in altering their arraignment requirements, 8" and by recommendations of such groups as the
ABA's Minimum Standards Committee on Pleas of Guilty"'- all of
which compel judges to inquire into the factual nature of the crime
before accepting a plea - the fact remains that inducements can be so
attractive to some defendants, particularly recidivisits with long prior
records, that they might be willing to plead guilty in order to avoid
trial on a higher charge. 7 The trustworthiness issue is not fully satisfied
by the requirement of factual inquiry by the judge or even by such
elaborate procedures as post plea-of-guilty hearings which are the practice in some jurisdictions, 8 and pretrial screens (such as the preliminary
hearing). Even by means of carefully prescribed requirements for both
the quantity and quality of evidence, it is conceivable that one who is
innocent can be convicted even after availing himself of all the safeguards of the trial system. It is believed that the number of innocent
persons so convicted is very small, just as it is hoped that the percentage
of innocent defendants who plead guilty is also small. Either possibility
is certainly reprehensible to the underlying ideology of our system of
8

See notes 90, 91 infra.

84 See note 9 supra.
85 Id.
86
87

See ABA PROJECT, supra note 1.
Comment, supra note 4, at 220-21.

88D. NEWMAN,

supra note 1, at 19-20.
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justice. Many judges take the position, therefore, that the possibility
of an innocent person pleading guilty should be given prime consideration in arraignment proceedings. The ABA's tentative draft on standards
relating to The Prosecutor's Function provides that "[al prosecutor
may not properly participate in a deposition by plea of guilty if he is
aware that the accused persists in denying guilt or the factual basis for
the plea, without disclosure to the court.'"'" It is interesting to note that
this proposed standard apparently does not preclude a prosecutor from
accepting a plea of guilty, where he has evidence to substantiate to his
own satisfaction of the guilt of the defendant even though the defendant
maintains his innocence, provided that the court is aware of the defendant's persistence in denying guilt.
Two recent United States Supreme Court decisions, McCarthy v.
United States9" and the followup case of Boykin v. Alabama,9 have
been interpreted to make the provisions of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure"2 applicable to all states. Among other things,
these decisions are interpreted to now make it a requirement for the
judge to personally address the defendant and to satisfy himself that
there is a factual basis for the guilty plea. This would not eliminate the
possibility of convicting the innocent pleader, but hopefully would
reduce it.
2. The Sub Rosa Existence of Plea Negotiation Introduces
Inequalities into Adjudication and Sentencing Practices
There is a question of whether it is possible to work out equal
bargaining opportunities for all defendants. For example, those defendants who know of negotiation possibilities have an intrinsic charging
and sentencing advantage over those who are strangers. Further, if the
existence of plea negotiation is known only to a segment of the bar and
if a defendant retains or is assigned counsel who is familiar with such
practices, then there is a built-in inequality in the system against the
defendant who is either without counsel or without counsel who is
familiar with plea negotiation.
To combat such problems, a section of the ABA proposed standards,
The Prosecutor'sFunction, provides: "(a) The prosecutor should make
known a general policy of willingness to consult with defense counsel
concerning disposition of charges by plea.""3 In effect, the ABA provision would require the prosecutor to give notice of the practice, so
that its availability would be common knowledge to all defendants,
8ABA

PROJECT ON

MINIMUM

STANDARDS

FOR CRIMINAL

Function, §4.2 (tent. draft, 1970).
90 McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
91Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
92 See note 9 supra.
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rich or poor, resident or stranger. Furthermore, the ABA proposal also
requires defense counsel under certain conditions to explore the possibility of negotiation: Proposed Standard 6.1 of The Defense Function
provides: "(b) When the lawyer concludes, on the basis of full investigation and study, that under controlling law and the evidence a conviction is probable, he should so advise the accused and seek his consent
to engage in plea discussions with the prosecutor, if such appears
desirable. ' 9 4 In discussion thereafter, it is suggested that if a lawyer
lacks sufficient personal experience, he should consult experienced
colleagues.9 5
The negotiating skill of the attorney may also contribute to sentence
disparity;98 for perhaps a large part of sentence disparity is the result
of disparity in charging and plea negotiation. This is particularly critical
to both defendants and the community as it applies to the choice of
probation or imprisonment. In theory, persons selected to serve their
sentences in the community under supervision are chosen on the basis
of characteristics which call for low risk of recidivism and a chance for
successful community adjustment as law-abiding citizens. If, indeed,
probation is given as payment for plea bargaining, selection is then
based in part on skill in negotiation rather than on the other more
acceptable criteria. Granted, it may be that few dangerous or otherwise
serious offenders can actually deal for probation; nevertheless, selection
by negotiation leads to an insidious corruption of the probation service.
3. The Existence of Plea Negotiations Avoids the Testing of
Many Legal Issues That Are Now Cloudy
How effective is the exclusionary rule if defendants do not even
raise it because they decide to plead guilty? How effective are the other
constitutional rights so carefully safeguarded at trial if they are waived
by as many as 90 percent of the defendants passing through the courts?
How operationally important are such defenses as insanity or entrapment if they are rarely raised? On these grounds alone- that is, that
plea negotiation avoids the articulation and refinement of legal defenses
9 ABA PROJECT ON MrNIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, The Delense Function,

§ 6.1(b) (tent. draft, 1970).
9 Id.§ 6.1(b) (commentary). It is suggested that Legal Aid and Public Defender offices
could serve as sources of potential assistance. This points up an interesting opinion that
some experienced courtroom observers have voiced, namely, that persons represented by
a public defender are sometimes better off than those defended by retained attorneys.
The issue, of course, is not one of superior legal skills in a formal sense, but one of
savvy in the ways of the criminal courts, the prosecutor's office, and the hallways of the
courthouse. It is ironic perhaps, that legal ability necessary to properly defend a client
at trial is not necessarily the same as the knowledge and ability required for plea negotiation. There can be little doubt that the Public Defender's Offices in most jurisdictions
are aware of plea negotiations and have a fair idea of a going rate for most charges, and
therefore those lawyers are able to get their clients at least as good a deal as most other
similarly situated defendants.
96 For a discussion of the effects of sentence disparity on correctional objectives, see note 18
supra.
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and concepts- it is considered by some to be an improper form of
criminal procedure.9 1 If police practice illegal searches and questioning and if the defendants, who have their rights so infringed
upon, plead guilty in the majority of such instances, the police will not
be as effectively deterred from such illegal acts. If wrongful enforcement practices are not brought to light and if their concomitant defenses
are not used, a dynamic changing procedural law will be slow to develop.
4. Justice Can Be Too Quick
One quite proper legal and common administrative concern of
criminal justice is that its wheels grind too slowly. Excessive delay in
prosecution, trial, and sentencing are issues that are extremely bothersome in our system of justice and, of course, are in themselves pressures
which support the plea negotiation system. Justice delayed is truly
justice denied in many instances. On the other hand, while it is true
that justice can be too slow, there is the inverse question of whether
it can be too speedy. "Quick justice" convictions in which defendants
are arrested, waive all their rights, plead guilty, and are sentenced and
transported to prison all in the course of a single day, while not common, occurs frequently enough to be bothersome and are seen as
intrinsically improper.9" The guilty plea system, including plea bargaining, opens the real possibility of excessive speed in contrast to reflective
and careful adjudication.
B. Concern for a Positive Public Attitude
The issues in this category, unlike those listed above, generally
focus on the effect of plea negotiation on the public's view of our
criminal justice system. These considerations involve claims that plea
negotiation is inherently repugnant; that it makes a mockery of our
system of justice; that it fosters disrespect for justice; and that it creates
public dissatisfaction because of the relative lack of details emerging
from guilty plea convictions.
1. The State Becoming Involved in Bargaining With Criminals
Over Charges and Sentences Is Inherently Repugnant in a
Society Dedicated to the Rule of Law
Plea bargaining provides almost unbridled discretion on the part
of prosecutors and trial court judges to avoid legislative sentencing
mandates, and to encapsulate the adjudicatory and charging stages of
the process, so that it is simply a pro forma step in the mass production
of suspects from the streets to the prisons. In addition, there are some
9 Alschuler,
98

The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50 (1968).
See DeMeerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947), rev'g People v. DeMeerleer, 313
Mich. 548, 21 N.W.2d 849 (1946); State ex rel Burnett v. Burke, 22 Wis. 2d 486,
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prosecutors, especially those newly elected or appointed, who would
prefer not to negotiate or "deal" with alleged criminals or their representatives. There are also some defense counsel who, for one reason
or another, have poor relationships with local prosecutors and, consequently, are at a disadvantage in negotiating on behalf of their clients.
The fact that such inequalities exist and that personalities of officials
can affect uniform disposition of cases inherently detracts from a system
involving widespread negotiation of pleas in a society dedicated to the
rule of law and not to the rule of men.
There have been some recent allegations that plea bargaining,
either implicit or explicit, is not only repugnant but also violates both
the fifth and sixth amendments to the Constitution. In fact, the authors
of a recent note in the Harvard Law Review concluded:
Well aware of the need for legislative response to a judicial
decision that invalidates plea bargaining, judges have avoided analyzing
the constitutionality of the practice. The bar, which has actively participated in plea bargaining, has attempted to dress it in procedural niceties
and has manufactured weak or faulty justifications for it. But neither
the lack of an assured legislative response nor the bar's substantial
involvement in the practice should affect the legal profession's evaluation of it. Lawyers and judges more than other citizens are under an
obligation to maintain the criminal process in conformity with the

Constitution. To restore the defendant's fundamental trial rights to their

traditional preeminence, plea bargaining should be declared unconstitutional. 99

2. Plea Bargaining Makes a Mockery of Our System of Justice
The facade of the typical arraignment session - where the defendant customarily denies that any promises have been made to him
while all in attendance know full well that promises have indeed been
made in exchange for his plea - is likely to produce a high degree of
cynicism in both the participants and observers of the system. Today,
however, some judges are changing their inquiries about promises or
inducements, limiting their questions to whether any promises have
been made to the defendant regarding sentencing. Sentencing promises
by the prosecutor or others are apparently viewed as a possibly wrongful
usurpation of the judge's powers whereas other bases of negotiation,
such as charge reduction, are ignored as strictly within the ambit of the
prosecutor's discretion. The issue here, as with the unhonored bargain,100
is not inducement per se but inducement that crosses lines of authority.
Yet as long as there is no recognition of the entire range of plea arrangements, but rather an avoidance of the issue, even to a pretense that
9 Note, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1387, 1411 (1970).
See also Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Process or a Third Model of the Criminal
Process, 79 YALE L. J. 359 (1970). See note 61 supra, § 4.1 (a).
100See

§ III (C) (1) supra.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 47

negotiation does not occur, the in-court ritual of guilty plea arraignments
will be viewed by many as a mockery of justice.
3. Because of the Intrinsic "Horse-Trading" or "Settling Out of
Court" Nature of Plea Negotiation, an Aura of Disrespect
For Justice and For Criminal Procedure Is Produced Not Only
Among Those Involved But Also Among the Public in General
It might be paraphrased that "it is not what you do that determines your charge and sentence but whom you know." Some observers
have commented that plea negotiation is really no different from a
"fix" which is usually taken to mean a form of corruption involving
monetary bribery or the trading of favors for bending the law to benefit
certain violators. 10 ' The sub rose nature of some plea negotiation contributes to the aura of corruption that tinges this practice as it now
exists. All that a defendant may know is that he has paid his attorney
a certain set sum, and in return the lawyer has been able to obtain some
sort of "deal" which results in a lesser charge or sentence (or both)
than he expected when arrested. It has been suggested that some
attorneys permit this misapprehension of a "fix" to exist in order to
justify fees. In short, they do not disabuse the client of his belief that
the court, police officers, and/or the prosecuting attorney have been
"taken care of" in order to obtain the lesser charge or the lenient
02
sentence.1
4. There Is Public Dissatisfaction with the Relative Lack of
Detail Emerging from Guilty Plea Convictions, Particularly in
Cases Where There Is a High Degree of Public Interest
The relatively anonymous guilty plea proceeding, with nothing
but the formal words of the charge admitted, may have many advantages for the reputation of the defendant and his family and may receive
general support on these grounds.103 In cases of great public interest
however, this anonymity is not necessarily viewed in the same way.
Where public figures are involved, either as perpetrators or victims,
there often is a demand for more information, while rumors and
suspicions that there is "more than meets the eye" abound. For example,
the guilty plea of Senator Edward Kennedy to the traffic charge following his automobile accident in which a young girl was killed was
viewed by many Americans as an inadequate termination of the case.
In fact, the pressure for further explanation was so great that the
Senator went on national television to explain his position. Much the
101 See Dash,

Cracks in the Foundation of CriminalJustice, 46 ILL. L. Rav. 385, 395 (1951).
See also Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101, 113 (5th Cir. 1957); Wight v. Rindskoph, 43 Wis. 344, 354 (1877).
102 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, App. A at 12.
103 See § I supra.
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same situation applies to the apparently negotiated guilty plea entered
by James Earl Ray in connection with the murder of Dr. Martin Luther
King. Here again, the sparse information contained in the charge and
the monosyllabic guilty plea hardly satisfied those who are more concerned about the full details of the murder of a notable public figure.
V.

COMPROMISE: DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN PROPER
AND IMPROPER BARGAINS

The grounds discussed above and probably others are commonly
offered as reasons for assessing the practice of plea negotiation as an
improper form of charging, adjudication, and sentencing in our system
of criminal justice. Even if one agrees with any or all of the bases of
the impropriety of such practices (either in general or in particular
cases which might "shock the conscience"), the question remains of
whether it is administratively feasible - or even whether it is at all
possible -to
abolish plea negotiation or, as Judge Levin put it, to
"'begin now gradually to eliminate plea bargaining.' '104
A position can be taken that if plea bargaining is improper per se,
then there can be no compromise with it. The administrative consequences would not necessarily mean that all defendants be tried but
simply that the guilty plea in itself would be an irrelevant factor in
sentencing and that inducement of guilty pleas, under any circumstances,
would be outlawed.' °5 Those holding this position would not see it to
be a question of controlling or limiting plea bargaining any more than
there would be a question of controlling or limiting the third degree.
In brief, if plea negotiation is equated with coercion, then no adjustment
is possible.
At the present time, however, total rejection of plea negotiation
and of the implicit sentence bargaining in all guilty pleas is not the
majority position among commentators, including appellate courts, on
nontrial adjudication. It is more common to distinguish, both factually
and philosophically, plea negotiation from coercion and to at least
attempt to spell out conditions under which bargaining might properly
be used and conditions under which it would be considered improper
per se. This ability to distinguish between (and control) the proper
versus the improper exercise of charging and sentencing concessions
to pleading defendants might well be a sensible solution to matters of
propriety in plea bargaining situations.
This type of analysis is not new to criminal justice issues. For
example, in the matter of search where there is insufficient evidence
l04 People v, Byrd, 12 Mich. App. 186, 162 N.W.2d at 798.
0 Judge Levin advocated this position in People v. Byrd, and his comments attack the
notion that a charge concession in exchange for a guilty plea is "individualization" of
justice. See his comments on this subject in the text, § III (C) (3) supra.
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to arrest a single suspect or to obtain a search warrant (as in roadblock
searches), the late Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson attempted to
distinguish the relative propriety of such "collective" searches on the
basis of the seriousness of the criminal conduct desired to be thwarted
or prevented, i.e., the motivation of the state. He stated that he would
possibly tolerate a roadblock search if the life of a kidnapped child
were involved but would not tolerate the same procedure if the purpose
was simply the recovery of a few bottles of untaxed whiskey and the
apprehension of a bootlegger."'0
It may well be that some propriety issues in plea negotiation can
be resolved on the same or similar grounds, i.e., on the motivation for
the bargain and the type of situation in which it occurs. For example,
courts are sometimes confronted with cases in which charges, while
technically correct, somehow seem inappropriate given the entire circumstances of the case and the characteristics of the perpetrator or the
victims. For example, in a forcible rape where the victim is random,
where violence is used, and where injury to the victim occurs, it would
seem to be inappropriate to reduce the charge to a lesser offense simply
to get a guilty plea. Not all rapes, however, follow this pattern. Sometimes a defendant is charged with rape when the victim is in fact a
semiprostitute who on the particular evening in question refused to
respond to advances as was her common practice. The defendant used
force to obtain what he had been led to expect; and, somehow, it
seems inappropriate that both his criminal record and sentence be
exactly the same as the rapist in the first instance, where the victim
was chosen at random, was otherwise innocent, and was injured. This
type of situation in which there are significant variations in the circumstances surrounding legally identical crimes is commonly faced by
prosecutors and courts, and it acts to confound the issue of the propriety
of plea negotiation, by entwining it within the ambit of the discretion
exercised by both prosecutors and judges, but hopefully in ways that
result in a system of equitable and just charging and sentencing.
In regard to the improper exercise of the practice, one could also
base the propriety concern on the motivation for plea bargaining on
the part of the state. For example, it could be argued that plea negotiation is intrinsically improper if the sole purpose of the state is to
induce a guilty plea under one or a combination of three conditions:
(1) solely because the evidence held by the state is weak or inadmissible
and conviction at trial is doubtful, (2) solely to avoid court crowding
and overwork, or (3) solely because of fear on the part of the prosecutor of the skill of the defense counsel. There is some interesting
evidence that these factors are relevant considerations in the state's
current motivation for negotiating with defendants. The University of
106 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949).
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Pennsylvania Law Review asked a group of chief prosecuting officials
from various states to indicate the considerations that motivated their
bargaining decision.1 0 7 The most frequently listed consideration in
striking a bargain was the lack of strength of the state's case; some
85 percent of the prosecutors who responded noted this weakness as an
important factor. Some 37 percent said the volume of work was an
influencing factor; only 32 percent said the harshness of the law
influenced their decisions (the avoidance of mandatory sentences and
the like); and 27 percent said that sympathy for the defendant was a
factor." 8 On the other hand, the author of a more recent study
commented:
My impressions differ from the conclusions of the Pennsylvania survey.
Every prosecutor I interviewed considered the strength of the case
relevant and almost every prosecutor considered "sympathy" and the
"workload" as well. Nevertheless, my impressions correlated with the
Law Review's conclusions on a basic point: If tactical considerations
are not the most important factor in bargaining, at least they are the
factor that prosecutors are most ready to avow. 109

If it is possible to list the primary consideration where plea bargaining would be considered inappropriateby the state, the opposite should
also be true. That is, there should be conditions (controlled perhaps
by requiring the prosecutor to present a written explanation of his
reasons or the judge to write such an opinion or both) under which
plea negotiation would be considered proper:
1. When the motivation is to avoid excessive consequences of mandatory sentences when they are clearly inappropriatein a particularcase.
This is simply the frank delegation of discretion to the prosecutor and
the trial court to distinguish between cases about which the legislature
has generalized. This is not an attempt to usurp legislative power but
is merely a way to introduce equity into a system that would otherwise
work some excessive hardships. Legislatures, after all, are political
collectivities which, when confronted with a particular crime situation,
are sometimes prone to enact excessively repressive legislation. For
example, some of the narcotics laws, if universally applied to all defendants who technically fit within the descriptions of the crimes, would
wreak havoc with any attempt to tailor the sanction to the total circumstances of any criminal action and to the characteristics of individual
defendants. After all, while a teenager selling a single marijuana
cigarette to a friend and a professional pusher of heroin may both be
guilty of sale of narcotics and subject to lengthy mandatory incarceration, their cases can be distinguished on the trial court level without
really violating the legislative purpose in condemning drug sellers.
107 Note, supra note 54, at 896-907.

lMId. at 901.
U0 Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHi. L. REv. 50, 59 (1968).
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2. When the motive is to avoid a criminal label which would imply
in the public mind that the defendant was guilty of conduct which is
really not consistent with the actions that formed his criminal violation.
For example, in a case".. in which a number of college students were
having a noisy party in an apartment near their campus, the police
arrested and charged the student owner of the apartment with, of all
things, "operating a disorderly house." Confronted with this charge,
the judge explained to the prosecutor and the arresting police officer
that the connotations of such a label were so negative that he would
not accept a plea of guilty even though the offense was a misdemeanor.
The charge was modified (not really reduced) to disorderly conduct.
The label of disorderly conduct against the male owner of the apartment was not felt to be particularly onerous or misleading. Likewise,
in another case in which a girl was arrested for shoplifting and was
charged with disorderly conduct, the judge refused to accept a plea
to this count, pointing out that a record of disorderly conduct in a case
of a young girl could be wrongfully interpreted as involving sexual
misbehavior, whereas petty larceny (again not really a lesser charge)
would likely be less damaging to the defendant in the long run.
3. When there is a crime involving co-defendants of unequal culpability. Again, this is simply a recognition of the prosecutor's discretion
to distinguish what the legislature cannot do; that is, to determine the
degree of involvement in a single offense on the part of multiple
persons involved in the crime. The same can hold true when there are
other mitigating circumstances, such as the participation of the victim
in a criminal activity (e.g., confidence games), or when the victim in
some other way contributed to the commission of the crime.
4. When the therapeutic benefits of alternative sentences can best
be achieved by charge reduction or by awarding probation to guilty
plea defendants, where normally such would not be the case. It has
been suggested by the drafters of the A.L.I. Model Penal Code that
such considerations be taken into consideration after the plea is tendered
so that the judge has the power to downgrade a charge to achieve this
end without first using it to induce the guilty plea.1"1 ' This is really an
extension of sentencing discretion which, while it may achieve the
same end of individualizing sentences as negotiated pleas, ignores
the operational significance of a preplea bargain. This is indeed a
"mercy of the court" situation which ignores the other administrative
advantages of negotiation. In any case, there may be situations in which
the sentencing structure is such that maximum benefit to the individual
110This illustration and the one which follows are from field observations made during

the preparation of the

AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION SURVEY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
THE UNITED STATES (1956-58).
11 ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE, § 6.12, Reduction of Conviction b) Court to Lesser Degree

of Felony or to Misdemeanor (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
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offender (with due consideration to the consequences for his victims)
can be achieved only by charge reduction or some other state concession.
If this were the primary motivation, then such reduction could well be
considered proper.
5. When charge reduction and sentencing leniency are used to
support law enforcement efforts by rewarding informants, state's witnesses and the like. This is sometimes called "trading the little ones for
the big ones"; but the fact remains that unless differential court leniency
is shown such persons, major cases cannot be developed. This is harder
to justify on proprietary grounds if one is initially unwilling to support
an informant system. If, however, one sees a relationship between the
activities of the court and the activities of law enforcement in the community, then a decision must be made about the propriety of using one
aspect - namely, sentencing or charge reduction -to
support the
activities of the other.
6. When the ultimate sentencing consequences may be too harsh.
This situation may arise when the consequences of new conviction are
excessive, because it may move a candidate closer to becoming labeled
an "habitual criminal" (with the attendant consequences) when, in
fact, the total circumstances of the case and the defendant's characteristics do not so indicate. This, again, is simply an adjustment of the
adjudicatory sentencing process - including alternatives like revocation
of parole in lieu of new prosecution - to achieve equity when full scale
conviction and sentencing would be too harsh.
Without attempting to exhaust the number of situations in which
plea negotiation might be considered proper, the point is that there may
be a distinction in the propriety of plea negotiation depending upon
the motivation of the state in engaging in the practice. When the
purpose of the negotiation is to avoid simple overcrowding, to push
through weak cases, or to bargain from fear, then plea negotiation is
clearly improper. On the other hand, an affirmative case can be made
for the individualization of justice and for the equity basis of plea
negotiation on the part of the prosecutor and the court. If such a
distinction can be made operational, then, of course, it must be circum112
scribed; it is necessary that all the controls enunciated by the ABA
and others are followed.
The price paid for a motivational basis of proper plea negotiation
may be similar to that of the exclusionary rule, namely, the freeing of
offenders when the constable has blundered."' 3 Inevitably, there will
be cases in which the state opts for a negotiated plea conviction not
See generally ABA PROJECT, supra note 1.
113 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); cf. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585
(1926), per Judge Cardozo, "[t]he criminal is to go free because the constable has
blundered." Id. at 21, 150 N.E. at 587.
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from altruistic reasons but because the evidence is weak or the witnesses
uncertain.1 14 This risk and its attendant costs will have to be weighed
against the desirability of the recognition of plea bargaining as proper
or improper under certain conditions.
VI.

CONTROL OF PLEA NEGOTIATION

If the basis of proper plea negotiation hinges on its purposes,
then, in addition to the admonitions of the ABA Committee, 1 5 there
must be more explicit expression of the details of the way pleas are
induced and a more elaborate record of the reasons and motivations
for reductions or other promises that are made. This is necessary if
such practices are to become reviewable by appellate courts.
Further, an accurate record of all plea agreements should be kept,
not only for purposes of review, but also so that followup studies can
be made to evaluate and analyze this practice in general. For example,
it would be clearly inconsistent with the equity purposes of negotiation
to release dangerous persons back into the community on probation in
exchange for a guilty plea. If this turned out to be a significant problem,
then no matter how beneficient the negotiation motives were at the
time, other controls would have to be introduced. Furthermore, allegations of discrimination would be easily testable if accurate records of
demographic, as well as criminal, activities of the offenders involved
in plea negotiations and those denied plea negotiation were kept by
the courts. The burden of such recordkeeping should be on the prosecutor and the judiciary, much as prisons and parole boards assume
obligations to evaluate their practices and their effectiveness in correctional decisions, such as release on parole and recidivism.
In addition to accurate recordkeeping, there should be limits (by
court rule or statute) on the range of charge reduction, since one of
the equal protection issues is not only the deal which can be made but
also the extent of the deal. That is, the reduction of murder to manslaughter may be one thing, but the reduction of murder to disorderly
conduct is quite another. Clearly, there should be no overcharging on
the part of the prosecutors in order to induce pleas. Likewise, there
probably should be no downgrading to "illogical" lesser offenses
where the actual charge bears no relationship to the criminal conduct
of the offender involved. In short, there must be some range set to
permissible downgrading no matter how noble the motive of the
prosecutor and the court.
114 Organized crime cases may fit this pattern. The prosecutor might bluff the defendant
into pleading to a lesser charge when the prosecutor knows the admissible evidence is
in all probability not sufficient for conviction.
I5Supra note 112.
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However, in each instance of plea bargaining there should be a
lesser charge available for a plea. This is not always the case. For
example, there is a problem now existing in the federal system because
certain crimes, such as a violation of the Dyer Act (interstate transportation of a stolen motor vehicle), contain no lesser included offense
to which a plea may be entered.1 16 Most defendants charged under
this section are teenagers, many having no prior records and no intent
to permanently deprive the owner of his vehicle. The prohibition against
illogical downgrading places federal prosecutors in a position of either
taking a plea to the Dyer Act felony on the nose or dismissing the charge
in its entirety. In most cases, some other charge - possibly a misdemeanor - would be preferable but is not available in federal courts.
Since under current conditions the burden of showing improper
negotiation is entirely with the person contesting his conviction, another
suggested change is that the state make affirmative statements in either
agreeing or refusing to negotiate. This is evidently being done in some
jurisdictions. For example, the Erie County District Attorney's Office
in New York has a written form on which defense counsel submit their
request for plea negotiation."1 Attorneys are required to set forth the
lesser plea they are seeking and the reasons that they believe justify
their request. This document is then submitted to the District Attorney's
Office for his approval or disapproval and for his comments. It is then
given to the judge for his disposition and eventually filed with the
court.
It would appear that such a formal procedure, well-posted and
publicized, wherein negotiation matters are reduced to writing, attested
to by defense counsel and a member of the prosecution's staff, and
approved or disapproved by the court, is one way to move plea negotiation into the realm of visible and orderly processing. Only when this
occurs, can the various facets and full dimensions of negotiated justice
be subject to the tests of effectiveness and propriety which our system
of criminal justice deserves.
APPENDIX

OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY
CITY COURT OF BUFFALO
D ate ................................

........ . ..................................

Defendant...............
P art ........... __.......... ............................
116 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1964).
117 See APPENDIX, p. 405 infra.

D ocket .....................................................
.

Charge ..................................................

Retu rnab le.........................................................................
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As attorney for the defendant, I offer a plea of guilty to a violation
of .... .

.................
.................................
..................................................
............................

I submit that this would represent substantial justice and would
give the Court ample latitude to deal properly with the matter.
I call the attention of the Court to the following factors:

Attorney for Defendant
COMMENT:

Assistant DistrictAttorney
DATE:

STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY COURT : ERIE COUNTY
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
-VS -

Indictment No ...................

Defendant (s)

SIR:
WHEREAS, you have been retained or assigned to defend the
above named defendant(s) on Indictment No

.................

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to an Order of the County
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Court a General Calendar Call will be held on ..........................
,
1968, at ......................... a.m ., County Court, Part ............................ ; at which time
the said indictment will be moved for trial;
PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that the District Attorney:
(1) Demands that if alibi testimony is intended to be offered on
behalf of the defendant that such information be supplied
pursuant to Section 295-L of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
(2) Hereby gives notice of his intention to offer into evidence
against the defendant upon the trial any and all confessions
and or admissions oral or written, alleged to have been made
by him/them pursuant to Section 813-F through 813-1, inclusive of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Rule XII of the
Erie County Court Rules.
(3)

Requests that if the defendant at the time of the commission
of the crime was between the ages of 16 and 19, any application requesting Youthful Offender treatment must be
processed immediately.

(4) Any application for a plea in this indictment must be made
by you in writing immediately. This request should contain a
detailed statement of the background of your client as well
as any other reasons that would give merit to the considerations requested.
Respectfully,
MICHAEL F. DILLON
District Attorney of Erie County
Attorney for the People
Erie County Court Building
25 Delaware Avenue
Buffalo, New York
D a te d : ....................................................
T o

. . ........................................

................................................
. .....................
.............................

Attorney for Defendant
Office and Post Office Address

